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This paper is an exercise in asking new questions from old theories.  New 
questions that lead to new theoretical considerations, and to new ideas for 
how  to  design  studies  and  analyze  data.  The  American  psychologist 
Abraham  Maslow  reputedly  said  ‘When  all  you  have  is  a  hammer, 
everything begins to look like a nail’. Building on this metaphor, this paper 
is an attempt at redesigning the tools we use, to see if we might hit on some 
other ‘truths’ than the ones we used to hit before. In this case, the suggestion 
is not to discard our old tools or theories altogether, but simply to take a 
critical look at them, to assess what they are good for, and then adjust them 
to  meet  our present  needs.  As  this  paper  is  intended  to  contribute  to  the 
Eurosphere
1 research project, ‘present needs’ are here defined as the need to 
research citizen participation in the European public sphere from a diversity 
perspective.  So  why  ask  about  gender  and  diversity  in  connection  with 
analyses of the public sphere? 
 
Habermas and 30 years of public sphere theory 
Jürgen  Habermas  initiated  debates  on  the  public  sphere  with  his  book 
Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit from 1962. Although it took more than two 
and a half decades for the book to be translated into English
2, Habermas´ 
ideas about communicative action and public political deliberation have been 
highly influential for research agendas across the world for quite a while. 
The  theory  has   been  discussed,  criticized  and  expanded  by  several 
contributors,  including  Habermas  himself,  whose  latest  book  length 
contribution  to  the  debate  appeared  in  German  in  1992  with  the  title 
Zwischen Faktizität und Geltung
3. Although Habermas has changed position 
on some issues, and nuanced his viewpoints on several others, it is possible 
to regard the 30 years between the two milestone publications as contributing 
to a consistent agenda, where focus continues to be on the  conditions for 
developing  a  free  and  democratic  dialogue  in  modern  society.  In  the 
following,  I  will  go  through  some  major  aspects  of  Habermas’  original 
position  as  well  as  the  version  of  his  public  sphere  theory  presented  in 
Between Facts and Norms. The governing idea in this paper, is a discussion 
of  how  Habermas’  theory  might  be  translated  at  the  empirical  level,  and 
which consequences his  approach (and that of his critics) might have for 
designing empirical studies of ongoing dialogues in contemporary societies. 
                                                 
1 For further details see www.eurosphere.uib.no 
2 Published in English with the title The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere in 1989 
3 Published in English with the title Between Facts and Norms in 1996 EUROSPHERE WORKING PAPER No.24                        PRISTED 
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  Following the argumentation from Habermas’ most encompassing work 
The Theory of Communicative Action
4, language, according to Habermas, has 
a capacity to coordinate action rather than merely to disclose the world. In 
other words, language is not just a means to transport information, but has an 
inherent  telos  to  reach  if  not  consensus
5  then  at  least  understanding, 
‘Reaching understanding is the inherent telos of human speech’ (Habermas 
1984: 287). This focus on language as a means to reach an end, also points to 
another important aspect of Habermas´ philosophy of language
6, namely that 
it is procedural rather than substantive, meaning that Habermas focuses on 
explicating the procedure leading to a rational consensus about the common 
good,  rather  than  saying  anything  about  what  such  a   consensus  should 
contain. ‘Die Diskursethik gibt keine inhaltlichen Orientierungen an, sondern 
eine  voraussetzungsvolle  Prozedur,  die  Unparteileichkeit  der 
Urteilsbildungskraft garantieren zoll’ (Habermas 1983: 132). Unlike liberal 
philosophers such as Rawls (1999a and 1999b), he does not wish to point to 
any concrete norms, but rather to a procedure for how to reach agreement 
about such norms ‘…es soll sich ja im Wettbewerb zwischen Proponenten 
und Opponenten erst  erweisen, ob diese [Norm] es  verdient anerkannt zu 
werden  oder  nicht’  (Habermas  1983:  236).  Talking  about  ‘der 
Überzeugungskraft  des  besseren  Argumentes’  (Habermas  1983:  171),  he 
argues that moral action has to be grounded on insight or reason. 
  This insight or reason is meant to come about through a dialogue between 
rational  partners  who  engage  with  each  other  in  order  to  reach  a  joint 
understanding about particular issues. This idea of dialogic engagement is at 
the core of Habermas´ notion of the deliberative democratic processes going 
on  within  the  public  sphere.  As  Elster  puts  it,  for  Habermas  ‘democracy 
revolves  around  the  transformation  rather  than  simply  the  aggregation  of 
preferences’  (Elster  1998:  1).  In  other  words,  Habermas´  theory  points 
towards  strategies  for  reaching  agreement  on  issues,  rather  than  merely 
letting the majority rule. Interestingly, Elster in this way sees a common core 
in  Rawls  and  Habermas,  namely  that  political  decision-making,  to  be 
legitimate,  must  be  the  outcome  of  deliberation  about  ends  among  free, 
equal, and rational agents. Thus the two political philosophers agree on the 
traditional  liberal  notion  of  free  rational  man,  ideally  equal  –  at  least  in 
situations  where  decisions  about  fundamental  societal  organisation  are  at 
stake. This means that Habermas joins liberal ideas about the citizen as an 
enlightened  person  possessing  independent  rationality  and  power  of 
judgement,  which  is  a  necessary  condition  for  deliberating  through 
reasonable  arguments  and  regulating  communicative  action.  This  is  the 
precondition for any dialogue about norms. An important difference between 
Rawls  and  Habermas  is  that  in  the  original  position  (Rawls  1999a:  118-
123
7), Rawls´ citizens merely have  political autonomy, whereas Habermas´ 
                                                 
4 Published in German in 1981, English translation appearing in 1984 and 1987 respectively of volumes I 
and II 
5 Habermas’ theoretical notion of consensus in the sense that everybody agrees for the same reasons is 
arguably of little empirical relevance. 
6 Properly denotated ‘discourse ethics’, I will, however, not use this phrase here, as I do not wish explicate 
this concept more than strictly necessary for my present purposes. 
7 Rawls conceptualises decisions about the common good as taking place behind ‘a veil of ignorance’ in an 
original foundational position for society, in which citizens lay down rules for justice and fairness without 
being aware of their own possible preferences.  EUROSPHERE WORKING PAPER No.24                        PRISTED 
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citizens  have  moral  autonomy.  However,  both  agree  that  the  democratic 
constitutional  state  does  not  represent  a  finished  structure,  but  is  always 
under negotiation and refinement, but differ on the point that where Rawls 
operates with ‘overlapping consensus’, Habermas seeks ‘truth’ in the form of 
consensus reached through dialogue.  
  Habermas  introduces  four  requirements  for  the  ideal  conversational 
situation, the situation he also describes as the ‘masterless dialogue’. The 
four premises can be presented as follows (based on Andersen and Kaspersen 
2000): 
 
 Everybody can partake in the discussion 
 Everybody can introduce and problematise any claim 
 Everybody can freely express his/her attitudes, wishes and needs 
 Nobody may be prevented through force from exercising these rights 
 
There  are  several  reasons  for  viewing  this  model  as  of  possibly  limited 
empirical  value.  The  primary  one  is  the  underlying  assumption  about the 
rationality of man, which Habermas here shares with Rawls and the Kantian 
tradition overall. Inherent in the first three requirements is a fundamental 
ontological  belief  in  the  rationality  of  man,  which  is  a  prerequisite  for 
postulating  that  everybody  can  partake  in  the  discussion,  introduce  and 
problematise claims and freely express attitudes and wishes. 
  Habermas  places  very  high  requirements  on  participants  engaged  in 
communicative action, an example would be the rationality requirement in 
the statement ‘In the context of communicative action, only those persons 
count  as  responsible  who,  as  members  of  the communication-community, 
can  orient  their  actions  to  intersubjectively  recognized  validity  claims’ 
(Habermas 1984: 14). This places restrictions on what can be uttered in a 
communicative  interaction,  and  points  towards  moderations  of  standpoint 
which  will  have  potentially  profound  effects  on  empirical  dialogues.  A 
further  demanding  requirement  is  the  idea  of  publicity,  which  states  that 
purely private reasons for a standpoint do no constitute an adequate standard 
for dialogue, ‘Anyone who is so privatistic in his attitudes and evaluations 
that they cannot be explained and rendered plausible by appeals to standards 
of evaluation is not behaving rationally’ (Habermas 1984: 17)
8. 
  Besides problems of rationality related to the first three requirements, 
brief  comments  to  the  fourth  and  final  requirement  that  ‘nobody  may  be 
prevented through force from exercising these rights’ are necessary. Force or 
power is a many-faceted concept, and often difficult to pinpoint in empirical 
situations. Hence it appears to make sense to reformulate Habermas´ fourth 
premiss along more positive lines, namely ‘Everybody should have access to 
exercising  these  rights’.  This  idea  of  ‘access’  retains  Habermas´  basic 
meaning  about  lack  of  prevention  and  would  be  easier  to  work  with  in 
empirical terms. The issue of access to debates is more easily measured, at 
                                                 
8 This is a requirement Habermas adopts from Kant´s Zum Ewigen Frieden, where Kant for example states 
that  ’Alle  auf  das  Recht  anderer  Menschen  bezogenen  Handlungen,  deren  Maxime  sich  nicht  mit  der 
Publizität  verträgt,  sind  unrecht’  (Kant  1917:  64).  This  formulation  occurs  in  Kant´s  commentary  to 
Perpetual  Peace,  in  the  section  entitled  ‘Von  der  Einhelligkeit  der  Politik  mit  der  Moral  nach  dem 
transzendentale Begriffe des offentlichen Rechtes’. EUROSPHERE WORKING PAPER No.24                        PRISTED 
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least  in  mechanistic  terms  of  physical  access  to  face-to-face  debates  or 
access to various forms of broadcast or print media within the public sphere. 
The concept of ‘access’ could be given a more normative meaning on top of 
the purely practical one, for example in the sense that society possibly holds 
a normative obligation to provide citizens with education or skills directed at 
enabling them to partake in democratic dialogue
9. 
  As already stated, Habermas´ description of the  ideal communicative 
situation has nothing to do with a substantive view on ethics. Rather, this is a 
prescription for a  procedural  ethics,  which  means  that  Habermas  leaves 
room for substantive disagreement among conversational partners about the 
good  (whether  common  or  individual),  as  long  as  they  adhere  to  the 
procedural rules of discourse ethics. Habermas´ theory does not prescribe 
concrete value judgements, only the rules by which such judgements can be 
assessed through dialogue. Importantly, this leads to a situation where only 
interested parties feel inclined to take part in the dialogue, and hence it is 
possible to reach consensus about norms which only apply to these interested 
parties. Norms can apply to specific areas and need not necessarily be part of 
an  overall  (statewide)  consensus.  This  opens  up  important  new  doors 
concerning the debate over diversity and minority participation in the public 
sphere, as it points towards a situation where specific needs and wishes may 
be taken account of in certain demarcated sections of society. While this is 
not an unproblematic conception, it also represents a pragmatic approach to 
accommodating  difference.  In  Habermas´  understanding  of  language  as  a 
capacity to coordinate action, lies an important indicator to how minority 
communities  might  attempt  to  gain  political  influence  via  the  already 
established  and  acknowledged  democratic  channels.  This  potential  for 
accommodating  minority  preferences  will  be  debated  further  below  in 
connection with the feminist critique of Habermas.  
  Remaining within Habermas’ own writing a little longer, Between Facts 
and Norms (Habermas: 1996) does represent a somewhat changed standpoint 
compared to previously. In this book, Habermas debates the potentials of the 
public sphere primarily in subchapter 8.3, ‘Civil Society, Public Opinion, 
and  Communicative  Power’  (Habermas  1996:  359-387).  Here  the  public 
sphere  is  described  as  ‘a  warning  system  with  sensors  that,  though 
unspecialized, are sensitive throughout society’ (Habermas 1996: 359), and it 
is stated that ‘The capacity of the public sphere to solve problems on its own 
is limited’ (Habermas 1996: 359, original emphasis), enforcing the idea that 
the role of the public sphere is to identify problems and also ‘convincingly 
and influentially thematize them, furnish them with possible solutions, and 
dramatize them in such a way that they are taken up and dealt with by the 
parliamentary complexes’ (Habermas 1996: 359, original emphasis). 
  In this way, Habermas introduces a distinction between opinion-forming 
and  decision-making  publics.  This  seriously  limits  the  role  of  the  non-
institutionalised public sphere in comparison with Habermas´ earlier views, 
which is further emphasized by the following quote;  ‘According to discourse 
theory,  the  success  of  deliberative  politics  depends  not  on  a  collectively 
acting  citizenry  but  on  the  institutionalization  of  the  corresponding 
                                                 
9 For a discussion of this in connection with analyses of examples of Aboriginal and Maori inclusion in 
majority school systems in Australia and New Zealand, see Pristed Nielsen 2007. EUROSPHERE WORKING PAPER No.24                        PRISTED 
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procedures  and  conditions  of  communication,  as  well  as  the  interplay  of 
institutionalized  deliberative  processes  with  informally  developed  public 
opinions’ (Habermas 1996: 298). Here I would argue that Habermas places 
undue emphasis on the institutionalisation of discourses. As Dryzek (2002) 
points  out,  the  public  sphere  is  not  necessarily  best  served  by  always 
delegating  its  debates  to  decision  by  political  institutions.  Perhaps  a 
particular issue is better served by continuing to be debated in the informal 
public  sphere  rather  than  be  sent  to  parliament/court/ministries  or  other 
institutions for a decision to be taken. Dryzek talks about the desirability of 
exclusion
10, and how the test should be whether the public sphere will be 
depleted if a debate is moved from the public sphere to for example a 
ministry,  giving  as  an  example  the  co -optation  of  certain  parts  of  the 
American  environmental  movement  under  the  Clinton  administration 
(Dryzek 2002: 96-97). 
  In  Between  Facts  and Norms  Habermas  also  takes  over  an  idea  from 
Bernhard  Peters  about  ‘centre  and  periphery’  in  order  to  explain  how 
political issues occur and travel from the public sphere to the parliamentary 
complex (Habermas 1996: 354ff). This view entails a model in which the 
political system forms the core or centre, which is to be distinguished from 
the  periphery  (the  public  sphere)  by  virtue  of  its  formal  decision-making 
powers. This model involves a notion of ‘sluices’ by which impulses are led 
in from the periphery to the centre. Condensing Habermas´ description, this 
means that issues such as for example nuclear power, genetic engineering, 
ecological threats etc. appear in the public sphere, and ‘Moving in from this 
outermost  periphery,  such  issues  force  their  way  into  newspapers  and 
interested  associations,  clubs,  professional  organizations,  academies  and 
universities  […social  movements  can  then]  dramatize  contributions, 
presenting  them  so  effectively  that  the  mass  media  take  up  the  matter 
[…which can be led] into the core of the political system and there receive 
formal consideration’ (Habermas 1996: 381). 
  Dryzek´s point about benevolent exclusion suggests  that some issues for 
public debate would in fact be ill served by receiving formal consideration. 
Furthermore, Habermas here appears to pays too much attention to formal 
parliamentary  debate  and  too  little  to  extra-parliamentary  governance. 
Sluices  are  operated  by  gatekeepers,  and  these  gatekeepers  might  be 
members  of  the  press  or  interest  organisations,  clubs,  professional  or 
voluntary organisations etc.; and these people might also have important say 
over which issues get treated and in what manner. Speaking about a one-way 
flow in a metaphor of water pooling to exert pressure on sluices, denies the 
intricacies  of  how  issues  for  political  or  societal  deliberation  actually 
develop. Habermas´ description becomes teleological, and while he adds that 
‘Naturally, there are other ways in which issues develop, other paths from 
the periphery to the centre, and other patterns involving complex branching 
and feedback loops’ (Habermas 1996: 382), he does not give any examples 
of such alternative paths. 
  Given that our starting point in the Eurosphere project is that modern 
societies are diverse societies, and that we wish to investigate conditions for 
                                                 
10 This is particularly debated in (Dryzek 2002: 81-114) chapter 4 ‘Insurgent Democracy: Civil Society and 
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‘free dialogue’, the above discussion of Habermas´ theory of communicative 
action points to a number of problems we need to consider in relation to a 
‘masterless’ or free democratic dialogue, and how we might move between 
the theoretical and empirical levels of this dialogue. The discussion above 
has already pointed to a few questions we might raise to facilitate this move 
between theory and the empirical level: 
Who  debates,  about  what  issues?  And  which  ‘gatekeepers’  or  actors 
influence  debates  to  go  in  which  directions?  What  resources  in  terms  of 
skills, time, access, power etc. are needed in order to participate? And what 
is the end goal of the dialogue? 
 
Feminist
  criticisms of Habermas 
The questions raised above can be regarded as questions to put to de facto 
public debates, questions that together form a kind of analytic realisation of 
various theoretical reservations about Habermas´ model. Some of the most 
important  theoretical  reservations  about  Habermas’  theory  come  from 
feminist
11  scholars, who have pointed to various problematic aspects and 
hence have contributed to the refinement of both the theoretical notion of the 
public  sphere as well as visions of the empirical potential of the theory. 
Some of the most important reservations have been that 
 
 The universal ideal hides particularisms 
 The criteria for rational discourse severely limits legitimate forms of 
expression 
 The goal of reaching consensus leads to exclusion of minority interests 
 
Some  of  the  most  important  feminist  voices  have  been  those  of  Seyla 
Benhabib,  Iris  Marion  Young  and  Nancy  Fraser,  who  together  have 
contributed  to  the  further  development  of  Habermas’  theory  in  a  more 
multiculturalist
12 direction, based on insights that spring from a concern with 
ethno-cultural  justice  from  a  feminist  point  of  view.  I mportant  new 
theoretical insights can be gleaned from this angle of approach, as it can help 
delineate normative boundaries for what should and what should not be up 
for deliberative debate and political and social accommodation. In addition, 
it is also possible to gain empirical insights about how, where, when and on 
which issues women and minority groups participate in public debates, based 
on this feminist criticism of Habermas’ model. 
  Benhabib´s  primary  reservation  concerns  the  risk  of  holding  an 
essentialist  view  of  culture.  She  greatly  emphasizes  the  need  to  retain  a 
dynamic view of culture rather than a static one; this is the most important 
aspect of her contribution to the debate over whether deliberative democracy 
would be a good model within which to accommodate group differences and 
interests. She re-evaluates the concept of culture as well as the concept of 
                                                 
11 Thanks to Christina Fiig for averting my attention to Judith Squires’ point that [...] ‘while it is feminist 
political theory that has explicitly theorized gender in recent times, it is entirely possible to consider gender 
in political theory from other perspectives than feminist’ (Squires 1999: 2 in Fiig 2008: 2). 
12  Multiculturalist understood in the sense of society consisting of a plurality of interests and group 
identifications. EUROSPHERE WORKING PAPER No.24                        PRISTED 
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individuality  (Benhabib  2002),  and  generally  warns  against  holding 
premature normativistic views that will freeze existing group differences. In 
other words, she is – like Habermas – concerned with developing a model 
that  can  facilitate  continuous  interaction  between  different  (but  also 
changing) interests in society. She states in her preface that ‘I propose a 
deliberative democratic model that permits maximum cultural contestation 
within the public sphere, in and through the institutions and associations of 
civil society’ (Benhabib 2002: ix). This cultural contestation is necessary, 
she argues, because there has been a premature normativism which has led to 
‘an  all-too-quick  reification  of  given  group  identities’  (2002:  viii),  which 
risks leading to policy recommendations which will freeze existing group 
differences.  Therefore,  a  deliberative  democratic  approach  may  not  only 
ensure democratic legitimacy, but may also hinder illegitimate reifications of 
culture:  ‘The  claims  of  cultures  to  retain  their  individuality  […]  can  be 
realized only through risky dialogues with other cultures that can lead to 
estrangement  and  contestation  as  well  as  comprehensive  and  mutual 
learning’ (2002: xiv). 
  Because of her anti-essentialist view on culture, Benhabib says that ‘our 
guiding model has to be that of a medium of loosely associated, multiple foci 
of opinion formation and dissemination which affect one another in free and 
spontaneous  processes  of  communication’  (Benhabib  1996:  74).  Such  a 
statement presupposes that foci from which to form an opinion can indeed be 
located.  In  this  connection,  Benhabib  fails  to  make  sufficiently  clear  her 
assumptions about culture as a phenomenon that ‘from within […] need not 
appear as a whole’ (Benhabib 2002: 5), and the types of demands posed by 
minority spokespeople and the origin of the supposed legitimacy of those 
minority leaders posing such demands (2002: 16). Like Habermas, Benhabib 
professes to adhere to Gadamer`s ideal of Horizontverschmelzung (2002: 34-
35),  which  harmonizes  well  with  ensuring  a  non-static  view  of  culture. 
However, Benhabib fails to theorize adequately over any starting point for 
this  merging  of  horizons  –  presumably  a  merger  [Verschmelzung]  is  of 
something.  While  the  model  of  deliberative  democracy  focuses  on 
procedural fairness, its actual practice presupposes that legitimate interests 
can be articulated and thrown into the debate.  
  Benhabib  further  argues  that  Taylor  and  Kymlicka  (see  for  example 
Taylor 1994: 58-59 and Kymlicka 2001: 55
13) are too unitary and  flatten 
internal group divisions, for example in not paying sufficient attention to 
internal oppression of minorities within minorities. As Benhabib puts it, 
‘Kymlicka´s  own  arguments  […]  are  based  on  culturalist  premises  rather 
than political evaluations  of movements and their goals’ (2002: 65). It is 
necessary to look concretely at the types of claims and demands made by 
minorities and test them in a public debate, before extending any special 
rights. Benhabib suggests that ‘The status of women and children is a litmus 
test for multiculturalist aspirations and their theoretical defenders…’ (2002: 
80), and this does indeed come across as one relevant yardstick by which to 
measure group claims for accommodation of interests. 
                                                 
13 Both these references are to instances where Taylor and Kymlicka speak about what I would broadly 
designate ‘intergenerational justice’. These are arguments that to varying degrees are based on the notion 
that people are entitled to preserve their culture for the benefit of future generations. (For further debate see 
Pristed Nielsen, 2005: 44-49). EUROSPHERE WORKING PAPER No.24                        PRISTED 
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  Concerning  the  criticism  that  Habermas´  model  places  too  high 
requirements on the rationality of actors, Benhabib states that reality in many 
social  settings  in  fact  already  demands  an  ability  to  engage  in  dialogue, 
‘’Complex cultural dialogue’ is not only a sociological reality, but also an 
epistemological vantage point with methodological implications for social 
science and moral inquiry’ (Benhabib 2002: 48). While she acknowledges 
the  ideal  nature  of  the  deliberative  model,  she  sees  both  an  educational 
dimension to it, as well as a legitimizing one:  
  There is no presumption that moral and political dialogues will produce 
normative consensus, yet it is assumed that even when they fail to do so and 
we must resort to law to redraw the boundaries of co-existence, societies in 
which  such  multicultural  dialogues  take  place  in  the  public  sphere  will 
articulate  a  civic  point  of  view  and  a  civic  perspective  of  ‘enlarged 
mentality’ […] it is an idealized model in accordance with which we can 
measure the fairness and legitimacy of existing practices and aspire to reform 
them,  if and when the democratic will of the participants to do so exists 
(Benhabib 2002: 115, original emphasis). 
  This notion of ‘enlarged mentality’ or a ‘civic point of view’ through 
dialogic engagement is seconded by Iris Marion Young, who writes that ‘By 
including multiple perspectives, and not simply two that might be in direct 
contention  over  an  issue,  we  take  a  giant  step  toward  enlarging  thought’ 
(Young 2000: 116). A further argument advanced by Benhabib in favour of 
adopting a deliberative democratic model is that ‘Most democratic dialogue 
is not about incommensurables, but about divergent and convergent beliefs, 
and very often we do not know how deep these divergences are, or how great 
their  overlap  may  be,  until  we  have  engaged  in  conversation’  (Benhabib 
2002: 136). She adds the qualifying reservation that ‘deliberative democracy 
need not proceed from a unitarian model of the public sphere’ (2002: 138, 
original emphasis). 
  This is also a theme taken up by Young, in her writing about democratic 
inclusion. She argues that norms of deliberation value a particular style of 
expression, namely argument, which may lead to exclusion in the sense that 
standards of rationality in the public sphere often will value a particular style 
of argumentation. ‘By argument I mean the constuction [sic] of an orderly 
chain of reasoning from premisses to conclusion’ (Young 2000: 37). ‘[T]hese 
norms of ‘articulateness’ are culturally specific’ (2000: 38). Young therefore 
promotes  greeting,  rhetoric,  and  narrative  as  alternative  supplements  to 
traditional ‘Western’ ways of argumentation. 
  Greeting, or in political contexts public acknowledgement, is a form of 
communication where a subject directly recognizes the subjectivity of others, 
thereby  fostering  trust.  Rhetoric,  the  ways  that  political  assertions  and 
arguments are expressed, has several functions that contribute to inclusive 
and persuasive political communication, including calling attention to points 
and situating speakers and audience in relation to one another. Narrative also 
has several functions that counter exclusive tendencies and further argument. 
Among  other  functions,  narrative  empowers  relatively  disenfranchised 
groups to assert themselves publicly; it also offers means by which people 
whose experiences and beliefs differ so much that they do not share enough 
premisses  to  engage  in  fruitful  debate  can  nevertheless  reach  dialogical 
understanding (Young 2000: 53). EUROSPHERE WORKING PAPER No.24                        PRISTED 
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Neither Young´s identification of the ‘problem’ of deliberative democracy 
nor  her  proposed  solution  are  convincing,  however.  First  of  all,  she 
incorrectly  perceives  her  target.  It  simply  is  not  true  that  the  model  of 
deliberative democracy as such privileges a particular style of reasoning. It 
does presuppose that one can articulate standpoints and interests – but so do 
greeting,  rhetoric,  and  narrative.  Any  expression  in  public  that  can  be 
acknowledged as a truthful expression of interest in principle counts as an 
argument in deliberative debate. However, if it is merely an argument from 
purely personal interest, it will not be given much attention. Therefore, it is 
not true to say that the theory excludes ‘non-Western’ traditional forms of 
rational argumentation. 
  Secondly,  forms  of  greeting,  rhetoric,  and  narrative  can  be  just  as 
oppressive  as  forms  of  ‘rational’  argumentation  may  be.  Witness  the 
conferral  of  titles  upon  people  relating  to  aspects  as  diverse  as  marital, 
occupational, and educational status; titles which will often be included in 
greeting  ceremonies.  Also  practices  of  personal  narrative  or  story-telling 
within for example self-help groups or religious communities may be just as 
– if not more – oppressive than other types of expression.
14 Consequently, 
even if there were a problem, Young´s proposed solution would  not work. 
Furthermore, the imperative to be reasonable would  not disappear if one 
used  other  modes  of  expression  than  argumentation  –  something  Young 
herself also acknowledges: ‘To be reasonable is to be willing to change our 
opinions or preferences because others persuade us that our initial opinions 
or  preferences,  as  they  are  relevant  to  the  collective  problems  under 
discussion, are incorrect or inappropriate’ (Young 2000: 25). Whether one 
would use narrative or rhetoric to express an opinion, publicity and justice 
are still necessary requirements. ‘Because others are not likely to accept ‘I 
want this’ or ‘This policy is in my interest’ as reasons to accept a proposal, 
the  requirement  that  discussion  participants  try  to  make  their  claims 
understandable  and  persuasive  to  others  means  they  must  frame  the 
proposals in terms of justice’ (Young 2000: 115/116).  
  Like Benhabib, Young thus endorses a deliberative model of democracy 
with  certain  reservations.  Benhabib  argues  that  not  only  is  such  a  model 
normatively desirable - in view of the fact of cultural pluralism, it is also a 
sociological  necessity.  ‘In  effect  the  contemporary  global  situation  is 
creating real confrontations between cultures, languages, and nations, and if 
the unintended results of such real confrontations is to impinge upon the 
lives  of  others,  then  we  have  a  pragmatic  imperative  to  understand  each 
other  and  to  enter  into  a  cross-cultural  dialogue’  (Benhabib  2002:  36, 
original emphasis). 
  Benhabib bases her advocacy of the deliberative approach to democracy 
on  three  normative  principles  of  egalitarian  reciprocity,  voluntary  self-
ascription, and freedom of exit and association. ‘The principle of egalitarian 
reciprocity, interpreted within the confines of discourse ethics, stipulates that 
                                                 
14 Here Fraser (1990: 67) discusses how her notion of ’subaltern counterpublics’ may turn out to be a kind 
of ‘enclaves’, which she considers problematic due to the fact that such isolation causes voices from these 
counterpublics not to be heard. In addition, I would argue that the existence of such ‘enclaves’ is also 
problematic from the point of view that potential internal repression may go unchecked in such isolated 
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within discourses each should have the same right to various speech acts, to 
initiate new topics, and to ask for justification of the presuppositions of the 
conversation,  and  the  like’(Benhabib  2002:  107,  original  emphasis).  The 
principle  of  freedom  of  exit  and  association  is  connected  to  the  one  of 
voluntary self-ascription, both implying that nobody should be assigned a 
group identity without their explicit consent and wish, and that everybody 
should be free to exit any group if they so wish. Freedom in this connection 
even  possibly  means  extending  a  certain  level  of  compensation  for  any 
possible privileges lost upon leaving a group.
15 
  In this way, Benhabib differs from Young´s more general endorsement of 
deliberation, ‘The normative legitimacy of a democratic decision depends on 
the degree to which those affected by it have been included in the decision-
making processes and have had the opportunity to influence the outcomes’ 
(Young 2000: 5-6). As Young is arguing from the perspective of inclusion 
(her  book  is  entitled  Inclusion  and  Democracy),  she  advocates  the 
deliberative model in a somewhat different vein, I argue that the model of 
deliberative democracy implies a strong meaning of inclusion and political 
equality which, when implemented, increases the likelihood that democratic 
decision-making  processes  will  promote  justice  […]  Inclusive  democratic 
practice  is  likely  to  promote  the  most  just  results  because  people  aim  to 
persuade one another of the justice and wisdom of their claims, and are open 
to having their own opinions and understandings of their interests change in 
the process (Young 2000: 6). 
  A third feminist critic, who has added important new ideas to Habermas’ 
notion  of  the  public  sphere  is  Nancy  Fraser.  Fraser  (1990)  criticizes  the 
original  model  of  the  public  sphere  as  presented  in  Strukturwandel  der 
Öffentlichkeit, arguing that Habermas’ conception is too limiting for who can 
legitimately participate in public deliberation about the common good. She 
questions the claim that public discourses should be conceptualized as going 
on within a single unified public sphere, and she rather suggests a model of 
multiple overlapping spheres relating to different types of publics. Given that 
I  previously  argued  that  ‘modern  society’  is  de  facto  a  diverse  society 
consisting of diverse interests and preferences, this notion lends itself to a 
translation from the theoretical to the empirical level. Habermas himself has 
also taken up Fraser’s idea of weak and strong publics in Between Facts and 
Norms, but as I argued above, Fraser’s distinction between weak and strong 
publics,  which  in  Habermas’  rendition  becomes  opinion-forming  and 
decision-making publics, seem dissatisfactory from a normative perspective. 
Nevertheless,  the  idea  of  weak  (or  rather  ‘non-decision-making’)  publics, 
however, does represent a possible step forward in terms of lending voice to 
minority  interests.  The  question  is  rather  what  value  we  can  ascribe  to 
‘voice’ in itself; certainly not much if the goal remains reaching consensus in 
the strong sense of the word. However, in terms of analysing ongoing public 
debates, Fraser’s notions point to new places to seek empirical evidence (i.e. 
trough broadening our conception of what counts as a public sphere) and 
hence also to new analytic points about the outcome of public deliberation 
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(i.e.  it  facilitates  a  focus  on  which  voices  were  excluded  from  decision-
making in the end).  
  Summing up, Benhabib´s warning about the danger of too tight identity 
ascriptions, Young´s ideas about what should be considered legitimate forms 
of expression of interests, and Fraser’s point about which arenas for public 
deliberation should be included in analyses of who gets heard, altogether 
point  to  important  implications  for  how  to  design  studies  of  public 
deliberation about (political) interests and preferences. 
 
Lessons to learn for designing empirical research projects 
The feminist debate of the Habermasian concept of the public sphere in this 
way  leads  to  at  least  four  lessons  to  take  note  of  in  designing  empirical 
studies: 
 
  We need a heterogeneous conception of the public sphere. 
  We need to expand political analysis to new realms 
  We need to expand our conception of legitimate claims-making 
  Gender and other difference-making identity categories are important 
organizing principles in social life, and hence they are also relevant in 
social analyses – however, we should never reify these categories. 
 
Taken together, the above points would have tremendous implications for the 
design of empirical studies, because it would mean that we could potentially 
investigate  innumerable  forms  of  debates  going  on  in  various  sections  of 
society among groups who identify in different ways, using arguments based 
on various logics, all according to the topic at hand. There seems to be no 
vantage point from which to make such a study.  
  One way of beginning such a complex analysis, however, would be to 
return to Benhabib’s point above that the status of women can be regarded as 
a litmus test  – in this case for investigating the cross-cutting interests of 
various heterogeneous groups in diverse societies. Thus, there are very good 
theoretical and empirical reasons for the Eurosphere project as a whole to 
have  adopted  a  ‘gender  action  plan’
16.  Quite  simply  this  plan  asks  three 
questions in relation to the analysis of the entire dataset collected for the 
project: 
 
  Where are the women? 
  Gendering as a process (which issues are gendered, and how are they 
gendered?) 
  Diversity/pluralism/intersectionality 
 
These three questions are asked of the entirety of the dataset, which consists 
of data collected in four ‘sites’, which can be understood as examples of 
different types of publics (weak or strong, depending on one’s conception of 
power),  these  sites  being  political  parties,  media,  social  movements  or 
organizations and think tanks.  
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  Asking these questions about where the women are and how things are 
gendered, however, does not mean that we have taken account of the full 
implications of the theoretical arguments presented above. Neither does this 
seem a feasible task in an empirical study covering anything but a very small 
sample of persons. As stated, there seems to be no vantage point from which 
to start the analysis. However, another concept from feminist studies might 
help  us  getting  beyond  the  ‘litmus  test’  stage  of  asking  questions  about 
gender. This concept is ‘intersectionality’. 
‘Intersectionality’ is not a theory as such, but rather an analytic concept 
that can help refine empirical analyses, taking account of people’s multiple 
simultaneous  identifications.  Kimberlé  Crenshaw  coined  the  term 
‘intersectionality’,  using  it  in  the  article  ‘Mapping  the  Margins: 
Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color’ 
(1991), where she addresses how racism and sexism intersect in the lives of 
real people, but seldom in feminist and antiracist discourses and practices. 
Crenshaw argues that ’because of their intersectional identity as both women 
and people of color within discourses that are shaped to respond to one or 
the other, the interests  and experiences of women of color are frequently 
marginalized  within  both’  (Crenshaw,  1991:1244).  An  intersectional 
approach explores how ‘categories of race, class and gender are intertwined 
and mutually constitutive’ (Davis, 2008:71). 
  This means that we should not conceptualise intersectionality as a kind of 
road crossing where one identity may have priority over another, but rather 
as a complex set of multiple co-existing criss-crossing identifications. While 
intersectionality is a valuable methodological approach in itself, it can thus 
serve an additional purpose in case of the Eurosphere project. The theoretical 
debate above led to the fourfold conclusion that 
 
  We need to a heterogeneous conception of the public sphere. 
  We need to expand political analysis to new realms 
  We need to expand our conception of legitimate claims-making 
  Gender and other difference-making identity categories are important 
organizing principles in social life, and hence they are also relevant in 
social analyses – however, we should never reify these categories. 
 
I argued that this theoretical conclusion has so many implications for the 
design of empirical research agendas that it would be impossible to find a 
vantage point from which to take account of the entire heterogeneity implied 
by this. But I also argued that asking questions about gender could function 
as a litmus test for this diversity. In extension of this, I would argue that 
using intersectionality as a further methodological approach can function as a 
way of validating our findings. This does not mean that we take account of 
all types of public spheres, all political realms, all forms of claims-making or 
all forms of identity categories. But using the method of intersectionality, 
and asking how gender may play a role in comparison or conjunction with 
other types of self-identification, can be a way of triangulating results and 
giving an indication of how an all-encompassing diversity approach might 
affect our picture of the public sphere or spheres and the claims-making and 
deliberation going on within it/them. EUROSPHERE WORKING PAPER No.24                        PRISTED 
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